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Abstract. 
 
Prior research provides mixed results on the capacity of American shareholder activists 
to improve managerial behavior.  In Japan, however, alternative means of external 
control (e.g. take-over, litigations) are not as effective as in the U.S.  Challenging the 
management during the annual meeting may be the only option for disgruntled 
shareholders.  Yet, the situation is complicated by the existence of corporate racketeers 
who disrupt the meetings to black-mail management.  Our empirical results indicate 
that, contrary to governmental expectations, shareholder activism leads to subsequent 
improvement in corporate governance, informational environment and profitability.  It 
also enables firms to attract more foreign and individual shareholders.  This suggests 
that the Japanese authorities should reverse their policy of discouraging shareholder 
activism.   3
Shareholder activism in Japan: social pressure, public cost and organized crime. 
 
  During the last few years, Japan has been plagued by a deep-seated recession and a 
steady decline in stock prices.  An explanation often suggested for this situation is the 
existence of a sub-optimal system of corporate governance.  For example, 
board-interlocking is often presented as weakening the monitoring of Japanese 
management.  In this paper, we study a less-understood aspect of the governance 
structure.  Specifically we ask whether shareholder activism during annual meetings 
plays an important role in the Japanese system of corporate governance and whether this 
role is positive or not. 
 
Japan offers several interesting features to study this question.  First, from a 
practical point of view, and contrary to the U.S. or most other countries, a comprehensive 
dataset containing the date and the length of meetings, the number of questions asked or 
the number of shareholders present is available for most publicly traded firms.  This 
avoids the high collection cost that potentially leads to small samples and possible biases.   
Japan is also interesting because it offers an underlying tension due to the involvement of 
the organized crime in the economy.  In most countries, lengthy meetings may be   4
thought as reflecting the healthy activity of shareholders and their capacity to freely 
challenge management.    However, the situation in Japan is complicated by the presence 
of “sôkaiya”.  Sôkaiya  can be defined as corporate extortionists, who are typically 
related to the local mafia (“yakuza”).    Their specialty is to operate during shareholders’ 
meetings.  They essentially offer the management the option to ensure (for a fee) that 
the annual meeting will proceed smoothly by intimidating “legitimate” shareholders or 
physically preventing them from exercising any pressure on management.      At the same 
time, they make the threat of disrupting the meeting if their offer is declined.    Since the 
sôkaiya are part of the “underground economy”, it is of course hard to obtain reliable 
statistics.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that they may play an important role.  
For example, in 1997, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, the fifth largest corporation in the world at 
the time, allegedly offered one sôkaiya a bribe of $96 million in the form of a “loan”.  
The proceeds were used to make large investments in the biggest Japanese brokerage 
houses, which in turn were black-mailed (West [1999]).  In response to this problem, 
Japanese authorities have encouraged companies hold their meeting on the same day and 
at the same time.    The official aim of this tactic is to spread the sôkaiya manpower thin 
over numerous simultaneous meetings.  Yet, this policy is problematic because it has a   5
similar effect on legitimate activists who cannot participate effectively either.
1  In  other 
words, sôkaiya may offer justification for the management to adopt “defensive” behavior 
to avoid outside pressure, even if the firm is not under their immediate threat.  The 
negative impact of the mafia may therefore be more indirect and subtle than immediately 
thought.    Even if the issue of corporate racketeering is particularly salient in Japan, it is 
common to many countries.    Italian sôkaiya are referred to as “disturbatori” while their 
South Korean counter-parts are called “chongheoggun”.  Although there is a large 
literature in the popular press concerning sôkaiya that emphasizes their influence, little 
systematic work beyond the reporting of anecdotal evidence has been done. 
 
The internal mechanisms of control within Japanese firms are typically 
considered to be weak and ineffective.    Absent any external pressure, management may 
be tempted to maximize its private benefits at the expense of shareholders and to reduce 
disclosure of publicly available information to conceal their behavior.  The channels to 
provide such a pressure are more limited in Japan than in other economies.  In this 
                                            
1  We define “legitimate” shareholder activism as the activity of shareholders who are not associated with 
the mafia, who asked questions pertaining to the firm (as opposed for example to questions related to the 
private life of the executives) and who do so with the intent of improving the operations of the firm.   6
context, asking embarrassing questions during annual meetings may be one of the few 
options left to disgruntle shareholders, short of selling the stocks.  In Japan, long 
meetings appear to create a private cost for managers.    For example, both the press and 
the authorities systematically monitor the length of the meetings.  In response, these 
managers have resorted to different techniques (including some criminal ones) to control 
the length and avoid any embarrassment.  As a consequence, significant departures 
from the 30 minutes target are rare and are typically forced by outside parties as a way to 
pressure management.    For instance, Yoshiaki Murakami, a leading shareholder activist, 
mounted an attack on the Tokyo Style management in 2002, asking the company to 
increase dividends, to buy back stocks and to appoint outside directors.    Although all of 
his resolutions were massively rejected during a marathon eight-hour shareholders’ 
annual meeting, the company subsequently decided to voluntarily comply with his 
demands.  Financial institutions were rumored to consider selling their stake in the 
company.
2  At the same time, sôkaiya also recognized from early on that they could 
profit from this situation by disrupting the annual event.  For example, the meeting of 
                                            
2 Murakami questions Tokyo Style voting, Financial Times, 24 May 2002; Murakami Questions 
Tokyo Style Over UFJ Group Investment, Nikkei Report, 3 December 2002; Tokyo Style Buys Back 
4mn Of Own Shares, Nikkei Report, 17 October 2002.   7
Matsuzakaya, a large Japanese retailer, lasted four hours in 1994 and three in 1995, 
extraordinary lengths by Japanese standards.  The management started paying the 
sôkaiya in 1996.  The meeting then lasted nineteen minutes in 1996 and thirty eight in 
1997.
3  It is not known at this point which of these two scenarios (Tokyo Style vs. 
Matsuzakaya) is more common. 
 
We use the existence of a sudden increase (a “spike”) in the duration of the 
meeting as a proxy for activism, be it caused by legitimate shareholders or by sôkaiya.  
These “spikes” do not necessarily reflect the full pressure exerted on the management 
since outside parties can extract concessions by using the mere threat of the disruption 
and by negotiating before the meeting.  However, the occurrence is most likely 
positively correlated with the actual degree of pressure (whose true extent is 
unobservable by the researchers).  Similarly, we do not see whether the pressure is 
applied by legitimate shareholders or by organized crime.  However, the subsequent 
consequences are very different depending on the source of the disruption.  If these 
“spikes” in intensity signal the pressure applied by the mafia, it should indicate by 
default that this firm is not already controlled.    In this case, it should either be well run 
                                            
3  Matsuzakaya Torishimariyaku to Sokaiya wo Taiho, Mainichi Shinbun, October 20, 1997   8
or if not, possibly subject to legitimate activism and improvement.  However, if the 
mob is successful, the situation can only deteriorate because sôkaiya would then prevent 
legitimate activism during the meetings and remove the incentives to improve the firm’s 
attractiveness to shareholders.  At the same time, management in a well run firm may 
decide to take advantage of this new “protection” to increase its private benefits.  
Conversely, if “spikes” signal legitimate investors’ pressure, improvement should occur 
on average, even if some attempts are unsuccessful. 
 
We explore empirically several possible effects of activism (while controlling for 
different factors that may cause long meetings but are not related to shareholder actions).   
First, we consider the effect on operational performance and profitability.    If the firm is 
under pressure from outside shareholders, management may decide to restructure the 
company in order to improve profitability and avoid future embarrassment at subsequent 
meetings.    However, if the disruption signals that the firm is more likely to start paying 
organized crime for protection, management may decide to take advantage of this to 
extract more private benefits at the expense of the shareholders.  Second, we consider 
the effect on the informational environment, since one of the common complains about 
Japanese firms is their lack of disclosure.  If “spikes” signal legitimate shareholders’   9
pressure, management may feel compel to be more forthcoming with information.  
Subsequent annual meetings should then become more active.    In addition, Durnev et al. 
[2001] report that firm-specific stock price variability is positively correlated with 
measures of stock price informativeness.  If the firm starts disclosing more, the stock 
price should move more independently from the rest of the exchange and the 
synchronicity should be reduced.  Conversely, if the management is about to be taken 
over by organized crime,
4  less information is expected to be released in the future as the 
mob would prevent indiscrete inquiries.    Finally, we consider the impact on shareholder 
composition.  To the extent that the firm becomes more transparent and more 
shareholder-friendly, it should attract more individual and foreign shareholders who 
could not initially access the information in a timely manner and may have felt to be at a 
disadvantage against large Japanese shareholders. 
 
  Results indicate that there is no negative market reaction after a lengthy meeting, 
but that average returns in the year following the “spike” are significantly higher than in 
the preceding one.  Meetings following “spikes” become more active than they were 
                                            
4 By “take-over”, we do not mean that sôkaiya are buying a significant portion of equity but rather that 
they gain influence within the firm.   10
before.  More questions are being asked, more shareholders are attending, they are less 
likely to be on the national meeting day and they are lasting longer (although this last 
result is less robust).  The synchronicity of the firm with the rest of the exchange 
declines, consistent with more firm specific information being incorporated.  From an 
operational point of view, the return on assets (ROA) is improving.  Finally, the 
percentage of shares held by foreign and individual investors increases, while the 
percentage held by financial institutions decreases.  Overall, those results suggest that 
shareholder activists are able to capitalize on the embarrassment caused by long 
meetings to improve governance.    They also suggest that Japanese firms use the sôkaiya 
as a justification for limiting the influence of these  activists.  Indeed,  firms  holding  their 
meetings on the national meeting day tend to have shorter ones with fewer shareholders 
attending and fewer questions being asked.  Their synchronicity is also higher while 
their profitability is lower.  They have fewer foreign and individual investors.  This 
suggests that the policy of concentrating meetings on one day should not be supported by 
Japanese authorities, but that on the contrary, activism should be encouraged.  Even if 
sôkaiya adversely affect some firms, shareholder activism does not currently appear to be 
a problem for the Japanese financial system but instead has some positive economic 
effects on corporate governance and market efficiency.   11
 
  We believe that the study is potentially relevant to practitioners, to policy 
makers and to academics involved in corporate governance in Japan, but also in other 
countries.  First, it contributes our understanding of corporate governance in general.  
We use Japan in this study because of a unique data set, of the size of its financial 
market and of the alleged involvement of organized crime but also because it offers a 
more powerful setting to study the effect of annual meetings per se (as opposed to 
other forms of shareholder activism).  We find strong evidence of positive effects of 
activism during Japanese meetings.  This is in contrast to results on activism in the 
U.S. where the evidence is mixed at best.  This may initially seem counter-intuitive 
given the reputation of Japan for weak shareholder protection.  However, it is not 
unexpected considering that the other mechanisms available to American investors 
(such as litigation or hostile take-over) are much weaker in Japan.  Disrupting annual 
meetings may therefore be the last option of disgruntled shareholders.  We believe 
that the empirical results are also relevant to policy makers in Japan.  As previously 
mentioned, Japanese authorities have supported policies restricting the influence of 
activists on the grounds that meetings would offer an opportunity for the mafia to 
infiltrate the economy.  Although our analysis suggests that long meetings entail   12
private costs for managers, we show that they have positive effects for the 
shareholders.  The policy of concentrating the meetings, on the other hand, is shown 
to be detrimental to market efficiency and corporate governance.  These results may 
help to understand the deep-seated recession and poor performance of the stock market 
in the last decade.  For example, La Porta et al. [1997] stress the importance of 
effective legal protection of shareholders in ensuring the existence of outside 
financing. 
 
I Background of shareholder activism. 
1)  “Legitimate” activism. 
  The question of whether outside shareholders, either large or small, can 
positively influence corporate governance or profitability through activism has been 
mainly researched within the American setting.  Most of the studies have used small 
and possibly non random samples.  Evidence of success is mixed at best.  Wahal 
[1996] considers the effect of shareholder activism from pension fund on American 
companies.  He reports that there are no significant abnormal returns at the time of the 
targeting for the vast majority of firms.    Results also suggest that there is no evidence of 
significant long-term improvement in either stock price or accounting measure.     13
Karpoff et al [1996] find comparable results for shareholder-initiated proxy proposals.  
Smith [1996] also finds no improvement in operating performance for firms targeted by 
CalPERS but reports an increase in price for firms that agree to cooperate with the fund.   
Strickland et al [1996] analyze the effect of the United Shareholder Association, an 
association of largely small shareholders, which negotiated 53 agreements with mainly 
large and poor performing American firms in order to improve their corporate 
governance.  The announcement of the agreement led to an average abnormal return of 
0.9%.
5  Prevost and Rao [2000] report that firms targeted once by pension funds 
experience no long term abnormal returns but firms subjected to repeated attacks 
experience negative ones.    The amount of research on Japan is limited, although Omura 
[1998] finds a positive correlation between the quality of corporate governance among 
Japanese firms and the amount of market-based financing. 
 
2)  Sôkaiya.  
 Sôkaiya  are Japanese corporate extortionists, who operate during shareholders’ 
meetings.  They essentially offer the management the option to ensure that the annual 
                                            
5 Interestingly, T. Picken Boone, the founder of United Shareholder Association, tried to bring the same 
methods to Japan but was shouted down by sôkaiya on his first (and only) attempt.     14
meeting will proceed smoothly by “controlling” undesirable questions.  At the same 
time, they make the threat of disrupting it if their offer is declined.  Although sôkaiya 
have been rumored to have murdered at least one uncooperative CEO, their actions 
typically involve less-violent methods.    For example, they may ask questions pertaining 
to the operations of the firms but also related to the personal life of the managers or they 
may simply disrupt the meeting by asking irrelevant questions or screaming. Ryall 
[2003] describes their approach in the following way: “If a company’s management 
refuses their demands for a payoff, they disrupt the meeting, shouting abuse at board 
members and accusing them – with or without ground – of sexual misconduct or gross 
mismanagement.  In a nation famed for its loved of harmony, their tactics proved 
remarkably successful for half a century.” 
 
  As the sôkaiya are part of the “underground economy”, reliable statistics are 
difficult to obtain.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are very active, 
even among large companies.  Apart from the cases of Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank and 
several large Japanese brokerage houses discussed in the introduction, world-famous 
corporations such as Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Toyota, Nissan and many others have 
either admitted or been rumored to pay-off sôkaiya (West [1999]).  An executive at   15
Ajinomoto, a processed food company, is said to have had a budget of as much as Y100 
million a year to negotiate with the sôkaiya (Ogino  [1997]).  In  1997, a survey of 1,200 
Japanese firms revealed that 67% recognized having paid sôkaiya, even though payments 
became a criminal offense in 1982.
6  The threat from the mob is sufficiently credible 
that Japanese authorities encourage firms to hold their meeting at a similar date.  The 
goal of this tactic is officially to prevent the sôkaiya to attend too many meetings but this 
has a similar effect on legitimate shareholders who cannot participate effectively either. 
However, in spite of this seemingly strong influence, there has been little systematic 
empirical study of this phenomenon.  For example, Maruko [2002] notes that “it is 
somewhat surprising that more has not been written about this form of organized crime.” 
 
III Hypotheses Development. 
  The internal mechanisms of control within Japanese firms are typically 
considered to be weak and ineffective.  Therefore, absent any external pressure, 
management may be tempted to behave in a way that is sub-optimal for the shareholders 
(for example, by making unprofitable investments to build an “empire”) and to reduce 
disclosure of publicly available information to conceal this behavior.  However, the 
                                            
6  Fushoji de Nigeru na, 896 Nikkei Business 38, 45 (1997).   16
means of providing such external pressure are not as widely available in Japan as in 
other economies.  For example, the market for take-over is not active (Shleifer and 
Vishny [1997]), shareholder litigation is rare (West [1999]) and managers’ compensation 
is typically not based on stock price (Kaplan [1994]).  Since analysts are typically 
compensated on the amount of shares bought by their clients, they may be reluctant to 
criticize the management of the firms they are essentially trying to promote (West 
[1999]). 
 
In this context, challenging the management during annual meetings may be one 
of the few choices left to disenfranchised investors, apart from selling the stocks.    Prior 
empirical evidence suggests that the actual length of the meetings is significant 
information in Japan and that maintaining the appearance of control is important.  For 
example, West [1999] reports that the length of large firms’ meeting is usually the top 
story on the Japanese evening news and that banks have to promptly report the meeting 
length to the Ministry of Finance.    More than 40% of the meetings in our sample lasted 
between 25 and 35 minutes.  As previously mentioned, a survey revealed that 67% of 
the firms had management willing to face criminal prosecution and jail time in order to 
keep the length of the meeting under control.  This would suggest that departure from   17
the target of 30 minutes is costly for the management, and thus, that any deviation should 
only occur under outside pressure.  An explanation for this cost is public opinion and 
embarrassment, factors that have been shown to affect managerial behavior.  For 
instance, the American shareholder activist Robert Monks resorted to public shaming of 
the directors of SEARS after his proxy fight failed.    Zingales [2000] indicates that “the 
embarrassment for the directors was so great that they implemented all the changes 
proposed by Monks”.  Skeel [2001] provides other examples of public shaming in the 
context of corporate law.  Dyck and Zingales [2003] report evidence suggesting that 
firms respond more to environmental pressure when the press is sufficiently strong to 
impose significant cost on the management’s reputation.  Wu [2003] also reports that 
public shaming by CalPERS can damage the reputation of American managers and 
directors.    Arguably, social pressure is even stronger in Japan.    For example, Dyck and 
Zingales [2003] report that Japan has the third highest readership in the world, 
suggesting a large demand for public information.  This may explain the strong dislike 
of Japanese management for long meetings and their exploitations by activists as a form 
of  black-mail.   
 
  We use the existence of an abnormally long meeting (a “spike”) as a sign of the   18
activism, whether it is caused by sôkaiya or by legitimate shareholders.  If “spikes” of 
activity signal an attempt by organized crime to take control of a company, it should 
indicate by default that this firm is not currently under the influence of the mob 
(otherwise it would not incur the cost of disrupting the meeting).  In this case, the firm 
should already be well-run or if not, possibly subject to legitimate activism.  However, 
if the mafia’s attempt to take-over the control of the firm is successful, the situation can 
only deteriorate because sôkaiya would then prevent legitimate activism during the 
meetings and remove the incentives to improve the firm’s operations.    A firm with poor 
current practices would have little incentive to change, while the management of a 
well-run firm may decide to take advantage of this new “protection” to increase its 
private benefits.  All criminal attempts may not be successful and some battles may 
happen between different groups fighting for territories, but on average, the quality of 
corporate governance should go down.  Conversely, if a sudden long meeting signals 
investors’ pressure to improve the firm’s behavior, progress should occur on average 
since the occurrence of the “attack” would make subsequent threats (either implicit or 
explicit) more credible.  Hence, management would become more likely to cave in 
during subsequent negotiations.  Thus, although the identity of the activists is not 
publicly available, it can be inferred from the ex post consequences of the long meeting.     19
Note that we only observe evidence of external pressure when there is a long meeting.  
It is quite likely that in some instances sôkaiya or legitimate activists approach 
management prior to the meeting and obtain what they want just by threatening to 
disrupt it.    Our tests therefore are likely to understate the real magnitude of the effect of 
contentious meetings.  However, we have no reason to believe that neither the 
legitimate activists nor the sôkaiya are better than the other group at extracting 
concessions based on the threat of disruption.    Therefore, we do not expect the direction 
of the effect to be systematically biased in favor of one of the two groups. 
 
  To empirically study these different possibilities, we investigate several aspects.   
First, we consider the effect on corporate governance through meetings’ characteristics of 
subsequent meetings.  If sudden long meetings are the precursor of an improvement in 
corporate governance, the subsequent ones should be less perfunctory.  This is, in turn, 
should attract more shareholders and a higher attendance should be observed.  On the 
other hand, if lengthy meetings are the first step in a mafia takeover, opposite results 
should be expected.  Second, we consider the effect on the informational environment 
by studying the firm synchronicity with the rest of the exchange.  Durnev et al. [2001] 
report that firm-specific stock price variability is positively correlated with measures of   20
stock price informativeness.  The more firm-specific information is incorporated into 
the price, the less it co-varies with the rest of the exchange.
7    If a lengthy meeting is the 
prelude to a reduction in disclosure, the amount of firm specific information should 
decline.  The synchronicity of the firm with the rest of the exchange (i.e. the R
2 of a 
regression explaining the firm return by the variation of the overall market and industry 
index) should subsequently increase.  Opposite results would be expected in case of 
legitimate activism.    Third, we consider the effect on profitability.    If the long meeting 
is due to disgruntled shareholders, management may initiate some restructuring to 
improve the firm’s operation, in which case the ROA or the likelihood of making a profit 
may be improving.  Finally, we consider the impact on shareholder composition.  To 
the extent that the firm becomes more transparent and more shareholder-friendly, it 
should attract a larger proportion of individual and foreign shareholders who could not 
initially access the information in a timely manner and may feel at a disadvantage against 
large Japanese shareholders.  Conversely, if organized crime is about to take control of 
                                            
7  To validate this result with Japanese data, we compute measures of price informativeness for Japanese 
securities similar to the ones described in Durnev et al [2001] or Lundholm and Myears [2002].  When 
we regress synchronicity on these measures (and different control variables), the coefficients are negative, 
consistent with synchronicity being a measure of firm specific information available to the Japanese 
market participants.   21
the firm, there should be a reduction in those categories. 
 
IV Empirical tests and results. 
1)  Sample. 
  We retrieve all information about the annual meetings (length, date, location, 
number of shareholders present, number of questions asked) from the Shiryoban Shoji 
Homu.    This publication reports the information for virtually every large and mid-sized 
Japanese firm.  The mere existence of this report suggests that the level of activity at 
annual meetings (or the departure from its expected level) is considered important in 
Japan.  We obtain data on price, earnings and other accounting information from the 
PACAP database.  We follow the convention of eliminating firms from the financial, 
insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors (PACAP item INDID equal to 501, 511, 512, 
513 or 601) since those firms face a different corporate governance environment.
8  The 
sample period covers 10 years from 1991 to 2000. 
 
2)  Descriptive statistics. 
                                            
8  When relevant, securities other than common stocks are deleted (PACAP item STKTYP not equal 1).   22
  Descriptive statistics are reported in table 1.    Annual meetings in Japan are not 
a lengthy process.  They last less than thirty minutes on average and no question is 
asked in the wide majority of the cases.    It is even a bit surprising that an average of 85 
shareholders (or on average slightly more than 1% of the shareholders) bother attending.   
By comparison, General Motors received a lot of negative press coverage in 1995 for 
having its shortest and smallest meeting in decades.  It lasted two and half hour, was 
attended by 137 shareholders (versus more than 1,600 people in 1992, a more typical 
year) and cost $150,000 (versus $1.2 million in 1994).
9 
We define a “spike” as an annual meeting that lasts more than 50% of the average 
time for a given firm.  To avoid cases where there is a large proportional but small 
absolute increase (e.g. a meeting lasting 16 minutes for a firm with an average of 10), we 
also require that the gathering lasts more than thirty minutes (the average in Japan 
reported in Table 1).
10    We first consider the 3-day (the day of the meeting, the previous 
trading day and the subsequent one) market-adjusted return after a lengthy meeting but 
                                            
9 “New GM Annual Meeting: Smallest, Shortest and Cheapest, But Circus-Like”, The Associated Press, 
26 May 1995. 
10  As a robustness check, we define a “shock” as a “spike” followed by a “valley” (a meeting that lasted 
less than 75% of the average time for the firm and less than 30 minutes) since this pattern may be more 
typical of a situation where sôkaiya are involved.    Results still hold.   23
we do not find any significant negative market reaction.
11  This suggests that long 
meetings are not an opportunity for the management to announce some important news 
such as plans to restructure the company or to reorganize the management.  We then 
examine the long term returns one year prior to the “spike” and one year after.    To do so, 
we form an equally weighted portfolio of firms which had a long meeting and we 
calculate the difference between their returns and the market return in each month.  In 
the 12 months prior to the “spike”, the portfolio had a significant average negative 
returns of -6.25% compared to the market (t-statistic = -5.01).
12  However, a similar 
portfolio had average monthly returns indistinguishable from the market in the following 
year for firms that did not have multiple long meetings and marginally negative 
(p-value=0.08) for firms that had multiple long meetings. 
                                            
11  When we vary the minimum length in the definition of a “spike” from 30 minutes to two hours, we do 
not find any significant negative market reaction unless the meeting last more than 2 hours, an 
extraordinary long time by Japanese standards.  Besides, we observe only 54 cases (out of 13,906 
observations where both return and length of the meeting are available, or 0.4% per cent of the annual 
meetings) that meet these criteria.    Even this significance is conditional on including 7 observations that 
had a return of more than 4% below the market that day.    Our results are comparable to the ones reported 
by West [1999]. 
12 Excluding the month prior to the meeting (during which annual results are typically announced) gives 
similar results.   24
 
  Table 2 reports the likelihood of a long meeting to occur.  We find 173 cases in the 
sample (or approximately 1.8% of all meetings).  From  a  theoretical point of view, it is 
unclear whether “spikes” should be anything but random.  To the extent that long 
meetings impose costs on both the management and the party causing them (being 
legitimate shareholders or sôkaiya), “spikes” should not happen if their only purpose is 
to extract some concessions from the management and if all parties are fully informed.  
If this is the case, the management should optimize the pay-off to the sôkaiya or to the 
shareholders so that it is not profitable for them to incur the cost of attacking.  The 
situation would be similar to the one described by Hicks [1963] in the case of strikes.  
They only happen in case of miscalculations by either party, and hence occur randomly.  
However, we further investigate this question by using two Probit regressions.  The 
dependent variable is SPIKEi,t (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a 
“spike” for firm i at year t, zero otherwise).  The independent variables are 
LOGASSETSi,t (the log of assets, PACAP item BAL9), SECTIONi,t (a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm is traded on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, zero otherwise), ROAi,t (the return on assets calculated as the ratio of PACAP 
item INC9 over PACAP item BAL9), LOSSi,t (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if   25
net income, PACAP item INC9, is negative, 0 otherwise) and FIRMRETi,t-1 (the firm 
yearly return, PACAP item DRETWD, including the month when the annual meeting 
occurs and the 11 months preceding). We also include DAYi,t (a variable that takes the 
value of one if the annual meeting is held on the mode date for the date, 0 otherwise), 
TIMEt (a time trend), FOREIGNi,t (item JAF79, shares owned by foreigners scaled by 
total number of shares, JAF81), INDIVi,t (item JAF80, shares owned individuals scaled 
by total shares).
13  In a second specification, we only control for LOGASSETSi,t, ROAi,t 
and LOSSi,t.  The standard errors are robust and allow for clustering of observations by 
year.  Empirical results are reported in Table 2, column 1 for the full model, column 2 
for the parsimonious one.  They indicate that long meetings are more likely for larger 
firms, suffering from a loss or a low ROA and having their meeting on a day different 
from most other Japanese firms.  This is broadly consistent with the results on firms 
targeted by American shareholder activists (e.g. Karpoff et al [1996], Wahal [1996]).  
The time trend suggests that long meetings became more common over time.    However, 
                                            
13  We also include GOVi,t (PACAP item JAF75, the shares owned by government and local government 
scaled by the total number of shares), FINi,t (item JAF76, shares owned by financial institutions, plus item 
JAF77, shares owned by securities companies, also scaled by the total number of shares), and CORPi,t 
(item JAF78, item owned by other business corporations scaled by the total number of shares).  These 
variables are not significant, not tabulated in Table 2 and not subsequently used in the Probit regressions.   26
consistent with the “random occurrence hypothesis”, the R
2 of the regression is small. 
 
3) Change in meeting characteristics.   
We consider the effect of a “spike” on the characteristics of  meetings.  To  do  so,  we 
use three main specifications.    The first one is an ordinary least square regression with a 
firm fixed effect (subsequently referred to as OLS FE) using firms that had a long 
meetings.  This specification assumes that the occurrence of a “spike” is random and 
that the effects are permanent.
14  We use the meeting characteristics (collectively 
referred to as CHARi,t in equation (1) below) as the dependent variable.  Specifically, we 
use: ATTENDi,t the number of shareholders attending the annual meeting of firm i at time 
t, PERCi,t, the percentage of shareholders attending the annual meeting, SENTQi,t, the 
number of questions sent by mail to the firm before the annual meeting, MEETQi,t, the 
number of questions asked at the meeting and LENGTHi,t, the length of the annual 
meeting in minutes and finally DAYi,t.  We then regress the characteristics on SPIKEi,t 
and AFTERi,t (a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the period subsequent to a 
“spike”, zero otherwise).  We control for the size of the firm by including LOGCAPi,t 
                                            
14  In particular, this specification ensures that our results are not driven by mean reversion.   27
(the log of the market capitalization, PACAP item MKTVAL, at the end of the month 
when the annual meeting occurs).  To control for the performance of the firm, we 
include three previously defined variables: ROAi,t, LOSSi,t  and  FIRMRETi,t-1.  All 
variables are demeaned to provide a firm fixed effect.  To avoid the overlapping and 
confounding effects of repeated long meetings, firms with multiple “spikes” are deleted 
when the OLS FE is run.  To the extend that multiple meetings signal that the first 
“spikes” were not successful in achieving the goals of the sôkaiya or the legitimate 
shareholders, deleting these firms enables to concentrate on cases where the subsequent 
effects are more likely to be produced. 
(1) CHARi,t = γ1 SPIKEi,t + γ2 AFTERi,t + γ3 LOGCAPi,t + γ4 ROAi,t  + γ5LOSSi,t + γ6 
FIRMRETi,t-1 + ei,t   
We also use a second specification that controls for the possible endogeneity of the 
occurrence of long meetings.  Following Maddala [1983], we estimate the effect of 
“spikes” with a two-step process.    First, we estimate the likelihood of a “spike” at time t 
through a Probit regression using LOGASSETSi,t,  ROAi,t, and LOSSi,t as exogenous 
variables (this is similar to the parsimonious model described in IV.2).
15  In a second 
                                            
15 As a sensitivity analysis, we also use the extended model from the Probit regression.  Most results   28




LAMBDAi,t (the inverse of the Mills ratio obtained from the first step).  The standard 
errors are corrected according to Maddala [1983].  The  dependent  variable in the second 
step is the change in meetings’ characteristics from the year preceding the meeting (t-1) 
to the year following the meeting (t+1).  We also consider the change from t+1 to t+2 
and from t+2 to t+3 but the results are not tabulated.    To be consistent with the OLS FE 
specification, firms with multiple long meetings are deleted in the tabulated results but 
we perform a sensitivity test on this truncation and discuss the qualitatively similar 
results obtained from the full sample. 




i,t + β4 LAMBDAi,t + εi,t 
As an alternative third specification, we use variables in the second step that are 
identical to the ones in the OLS FE but instead of demeaning them, we take the 
difference between t-1 and t+1.  To ensure that the results are not driven by corporate 
events simply correlated with long meetings but not related to shareholder activism, we 
also include ∆SHRi,t+1 (the absolute value of change in the total number of shares 
divided by the number of shares at t-1) and ∆ASSETi,t+1 (the absolute value of the 
                                                                                                                                     
carry on, generally with a higher significance.     29
change in total assets divided by total assets at t-1).  ∆SHRi,t+1 proxies for the changes 
in equity due to events which may trigger a longer meeting such as share issuances or 
buy-backs.  ∆ASSETi,t+1 proxies for a change in investment due to similar events such 
as major acquisitions or significant divestures.
17    Note that this last specification is only 
for descriptive purposes since we subsequently treat ∆ROAi,t+1 and  ∆LOSSi,t+1 as 
endogenous variables with respect to the “spike”. 
(3) ∆CHARi,t+1 = β0 + β1 SPIKEi,t + β2 ∆LOGCAPi,t+1 + β3 ∆ROAi,t+1 + β4 ∆LOSSi,t+1 + β5 
∆FIRMRETi,t+1 + β6 ∆SHRi,t+1 + β7 ∆ASSETi,t+1+ β8 LAMBDAi,t + εi,t 
 
Results reported in Table 3 indicate that meetings following a “spike” become more 
active.  All specifications indicate that more questions are asked at the meetings, that 
more shareholders attend, and that the meeting is less likely to be on the national meeting 
day.  SPIKEi,t is also associated with longer subsequent meetings in Panel C, when 
observations from firms subject to multiple “spikes” are included or when a “spike” is 
defined as lasting more than twice the average length of a given firm and more than 
                                                                                                                                     
16  Results for the industry dummies are not tabulated. 
17  Taking the signed value of the difference does not materially affect the results.   30
thirty minutes (these two last results are not tabulated).
18    Control variables 
unsurprisingly indicate that bigger firms are able to attract more shareholders and that 
the average length increased over-time.    When we consider the change between t+1 and 
t+2 or between t+2 and t+3, SPIKEi,t is positive in the ∆ATTEND, ∆PERC, ∆MEETINGQ, 
∆LENGTH regressions and negative in ∆DAY regressions.  The significance, however, 
varies with the model and the period considered.  Finally, untabulated results from 
cross-sectional level regressions indicate that most of the meeting characteristics are 
below average before the firm is subject to a long meeting but become either above or at 
the average after a “spike”. 
4) Synchronicity 
We compute SYNCHi,t, the R
2 of the following regression run on a calendar year 
basis:      (4)  Ri,d = a1 + b1 TOPIXd + b2 INDRETd + ei,d 
where Ri,d is the return for firm i on day d, TOPIXd is the return from the TOPIX index on 
                                            
18 The results for the other dependent variables in these alternative specifications are similar to the ones 
reported in panel B.  When either ∆FOREIGNi,t,  ∆FINi,t or ∆DAYi,t is included as additional control 
variable in the third specification, SPIKEi,t becomes significantly positive in the ∆LENGTH regression. 
Other results are qualitatively similar.    The results also hold (also in IV.3, IV.4 and IV.5).   31
day d, and INDRETd is the industry return day d as reported by PACAP.
19    We then use 
the three specifications described in IV.3.    The results reported in Table 4 indicate that a 
long meetings lead to subsequent decrease in synchronicity.    This is robust to including 
firms with multiple long meetings in the second specification (z-statistic = -11.45) or 
changing the definition of a long meeting to twice the average length (z-statistic= -8.91).   
Control variables suggest that synchronicity increases with size but declines with past 
return and losses.  Results are qualitatively similar when the change in ownership by 
foreigners or by financial institutions or when ∆DAY are included in the third 
specification.  Untabulated results from a cross-sectional level regression indicate that 
the synchronicity is higher than the average before a “spike” but becomes 
indistinguishable afterward. 
 
5) Change in profitability. 
  We then consider the effect of a “spike” on profitability.  To do so, we regress 
ROAi,t (or ∆ROAi,t+1) and LOSSi,t (or ∆LOSSi,t+1) using the three specifications previously 
described.
20  Results in Table 5 indicate that a “spike” is the precursor of an 
                                            
19  We delete firm-year observations where less than 50 data points are available to calculate the R
2. 
20 We also consider the log of the ratio of book-equity to market value.  However, the results are   32
improvement in ROA (at least when the endogeneity is taken into account).
21  P e r h a p s  
surprisingly, a loss is more likely in the year following a “spike”.  These results, 
however, are not robust and the significance disappears when alternative specifications 
are used.
22   They might be explained by the fact that some costly restructuring occurs 
shortly after the meeting for  some  firms.  In  fact,  STRIKEi,t becomes strongly significant 
across all specifications in the ∆ROA regression when the change between t+1 and t+2 or 
t+2 and t+3 is considered (the z-statistic for SPIKEi,t is typically close to 7).  In the 
∆LOSS regression, STRIKEi,t  is negative in later periods (although the significance 
disappears in some specifications).
23 
                                                                                                                                     
extremely unstable.  In the second and third models that control for endogeneity, a “spike” is strongly 
associated with a decrease of the ratio in the three periods but a fixed effect regression gives the opposite 
result. 
21 Only two firms that had a long meeting and should otherwise be included in our sample were delisted 
in the subsequent year because of bankruptcy.  This suggests that our results are not driven by survivor 
bias.  
22 In  the  ∆ROA regressions, SPIKEi,t becomes negative when firms subject to multiple spikes are included 
or when a spike is defined as lasting more than twice the average for the firm.    In the ∆LOSS regressions, 
the significance disappears when the full model is used in the first step, when change in asset (instead of 
the absolute value of the change) or ∆FINi,t+1 are incorporated in the regression. 
23 Note, however, that the occurrence of loss is affected by both the economic performance of the firm 
and the conservatism of the accounting policy (in the sense of Basu [1997]).  If the firm becomes more 
forthcoming with bad news, the likelihood of accounting loses may increase, even though the true   33
 
6) Change in shareholder composition. 
  Finally, we consider the impact on the shareholder composition.  We run the 3 
specifications previously described using the percentage of a given type of shareholders 
owning stocks in a given firm in a given year as dependent variables.  Specifically, we 
consider FINi,t, FOREIGNi,t, and INDIVi,t.  Results reported in Table 6 indicate that the 
percentage of shares held by financial institutions is decreasing while foreigners buy 
more stocks.    This is also true when the changes between t+1 and t+2 or t+2 and t+3 are 
considered (the z-statistics are between -4.05 and -5.60 for ∆FIN, 2.36 and 5.27 for 
∆FOREIGN).  Results for individual shareholders are less robust.  Results in panel A 
indicate that individual shareholders buy stocks but the significance disappears in Panel 
B and C.
24   
 
7)  The effect of meeting clustering. 
                                                                                                                                     
profitability is increasing. 
24  The coefficient becomes negative in Panel C when the change in asset (instead of the absolute value of 
the change) is incorporated in the regression but significantly positive in both panel B and C when firms 
subject to multiple “spikes” are included or when “spikes” are defined as lasting more than twice the 
average length for the firm.   34
  Overall, these empirical results suggest that long meetings and shareholder 
activism have positive effects.  In fact, the policy of encouraging firms to hold their 
meetings on the same day may be counter-productive.  Omura [1998] report that 
Japanese mutual fund managers consider that the concentration of meetings prevent them 
from effectively lobbying firms to improve corporate governance.  Results from 
cross-sectional regressions reported in Table 7 indicate that firms that having their annual 
meeting on the same day as most of the other firms tend to have shorter meetings, with 
fewer shareholders attending and asking fewer questions.  They also have a higher 
synchronicity, a lower ROA and a higher likelihood of suffering from losses.  Finally, 
they are less able to attract foreign or individual shareholders.  Results (not reported) 
are similar when a treatment effect model is used instead of cross-sectional regressions.
25  
In addition, when we only use firms that hold their meetings outside the national meeting 
day, the results from Table 3 to 6 (Panel B or Column II) essentially carry on.
26  T h i s  
                                            
25  SPIKEi,t, LOGASSETi,t, the overall market return and industry dummies are used as instrumental 
variables for DAYi,t.  LOGCAPi,t, ROAi,t, LOSSi,t, FIRMRETi,t-1 and TIMEt are used as control variables 
in the second step. 
26  Compared to the cross-sectional regressions, the effect on the change in the percentage of shareholders 
attending meetings becomes significantly positive.    The effect on the change in the number of questions 
asked at the meetings, in ROA (with a z-statistics of 1.85 in the full sample) and in the percentage of 
shares held by individuals (negative in the full sample but positive with the third specification) become   35
suggests that even when sôkaiya are more able to exercise their alleged capacity for 
disruption, no significant adverse effect is observed.  This would be consistent with 
Japanese firms strategically using them.  It also suggests that the policy of supporting 




  Prior research on whether shareholders activists can force American managers to 
improve their behavior provides mixed results.    In Japan, however, alternative channels 
for improvement (e.g. take-over, litigations) are not as effective as they are in the U.S.  
Thus, challenging the management during annual meetings may be the only option for 
disgruntled shareholders to exert pressure.  Yet, the situation is complicated by the 
existence of corporate racketeers who disrupt these events in order to black-mail 
                                                                                                                                     
insignificant.  All other results are qualitatively similar.  Note, however, that this specification controls 
for the fact that the “spike” is not random but treats the choice of the day for the meeting as exogenous. 
27  It is possible, however, that the sôkaiya have already taken control of all the firms they could.    If this 
is true, they would not appear in our sample of “spikes” but still exert an influence.  Thus, the 
recommendation on policy may be reversed if this is the case, and there is an exogenous departure from 
the equilibrium at some point in the future, and the clustering prevents the mafia to revert back to the 
current equilibrium and the cost of preventing this hypothetical return is less than the cost imposed by the 
restrictions of legitimate activism.    However, we have no empirical support for such scenario.   36
management.  Anecdotal evidence and results from surveys suggest that this form of 
corporate racketeering is prevalent.  In response, the authorities have taken various 
measures to reduce the importance of these meetings in order to minimize the influence 
of organized crime.    Yet, this policy also comes at the expense of legitimate shareholder 
activism.  The goal of this paper is first to verify whether annual meetings are really a 
powerful tool to pressure management and then to examine whether this pressure has on 
average a positive or negative effect. 
 
  Empirical results indicate that there is no negative market reaction after a 
lengthy meeting, but that average returns in the year following the “spike” are 
significantly higher than in the preceding one.  Subsequent meetings become more 
active: more questions are being asked, more shareholders attend, meetings are less 
likely to occur on the national meeting day and they may last longer.  In addition, the 
synchronicity of the firm with the rest of the exchange declines, suggesting more firm 
specific information is incorporated.  The ROA is improving.  Finally, the percentage 
of shares held by foreign and individual investors increases, while the percentage held by 
financial institutions decreases.    Overall, those results suggest that shareholder activists 
are able to capitalize on the embarrassment caused by long meetings to improve   37
governance.  Even if sôkaiya are an actual problem for some firms, Japanese managers 
appear to be using this threat as a way to reduce legitimate outside pressure.  Results 
also suggests that the policy of concentrating annual meetings on one day has negative 
implications and should not be supported by the Japanese authorities, but that on the 
contrary, shareholder activism should be encouraged.   38
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Length is expressed in minutes.  Meetings questions are expressed in number of 
questions.  Attendance is the number of shareholders present at the annual meeting.  
PERC is the percentage of shareholders attending the meeting (multiplied by 100 to be 
expressed in %). 
   42
Table 2: Likelihood of having a “spike”. 
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Table 2 provides the results from Probit regressions with robust standard errors 
allowing for clustering of observations by year.  Z-statistics are reported in brackets; 
standard errors are robust and allow for clustering of observations by year.  44
Table 3: Effect of a “spike” on future annual meetings. 
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Panel B: Difference 
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9,553   47
T-statistics (panel A) and z-statistics (panel B and C) are reported in brackets.  
Standard errors in panel A are robust and allow for clustering of observations by year.  
Standard errors in panel B and C are corrected according to Maddala [1983].  Results 
for the industries dummies are omitted from panel B.  Coefficients for ∆PERC are 
multiplied by 100 for expositional clarity.   48
Table 4: analysis of synchronicity. 


































































































2 19.90     
N 3,314  9,553 9,553 
  
T-statistics (Column I) and z-statistics (column II and III) are reported in brackets.  Standard errors in 
column I are robust and allow for clustering of observations by year.  Standard errors in column II and 
III are corrected according to Maddala [1983].  Results for the industries dummies are omitted from 
column II.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for expositional clarity.   49
Table 5: analysis of profitability. 
Panel A: Return on Assets. 
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Panel B: Likelihood of losses. 








































































































   51
T-statistics (Column I) and z-statistics (column II and III) are reported in brackets.  
Standard errors column I are robust and allow for clustering of observations by year.  
Standard errors in column II and III are corrected according to Maddala [1983].  
Results for the industries dummies are omitted from column II.  Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for expositional clarity.   52
Table 6: Effect on shareholder composition. 























































































































3,314   53
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All coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for expositional clarity.  T-statistics (panel A) 
and z-statistics (panel B and C) are reported in brackets.  Standard errors in panel A 
are robust and allow for clustering of observations by year.  Standard errors in panel 
B and C are corrected according to Maddala [1983].  Results for the industries 
dummies are omitted from panel B.  Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for 
expositional clarity.   56




















































































































































































































































































































Z-statistics are reported in brackets; all standard errors are robust and allow for 
clustering of observations by year.  Coefficient for PERC, INDIV, FOREIGN, ROA 
and LOSS have been multiplied by 100 for expositional clarity. 